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Introduction
-- I examined the influence of a leader's 
dissenting behavior in an intergroup task on a 
group member's evaluation of the leader's 
performance. 
-- Group members participated in a Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game (PDG). False feedback created 
a cooperative ingroup decision and then group 
members were informed of the leader’s 
apparent decision to conform to or dissent from 
the group's decision. This decision was paired 
with a high or low payout. 
-- I investigated predictions based on Social 
Identity Theory (SIT), Realistic Group Conflict 
Theory (RGCT), and Norm of Group Interest 
(NGI). 
• NGI predicted group members high in the 
tendency to pursue group interests should 
make evaluations of the leader based on 
payout
• RGCT predicted that intergroup relations 
stem from outcome. As such, all group 
members should be concerned with payout
• SIT predicted that only highly-identified group 
members should be concerned with payout. 
Low identified members should care about 
the leaders decision.  
Methods
Participants: 
• Undergraduate students (n = 12) recruited from 
SONA system and compensated with research 
credit
Procedure: 
• Participants completed the NGI scale, were 
informed of the task, their group (Group A), and 
divided into roles (always group member, group 
leader played by confederate)
• Participants completed Inclusion of Other in the Self 
scale (IOS), and Social identification scale
• Participants were led to believe that the leader met 
with other group’s leader and were informed of their 
group’s preference (X), the leader’s decision (X or 
Y), the other group’s decision (X or Y), and the 
resulting outcome (high or low payout)
• Participants completed Leader evaluation, ingroup 
identity, and performance/motivation scales
Measures: 
• NGI scale (Montoya & Pittinsky, 2013) assess 
tendency to adhere to group norms
• IOS scale (Aron et al., 1992) a measure of 
closeness to group
• Social Identification (Cameron, 2004) a measure of 
group identification
• Leader evaluation (Platow & van Knippenberg, 
2001) a combined measure of leader evaluation
• Common ingroup identity (Gaertner et al., 1996) 
measures understanding of their group as separate 
from other group
• Performance/motivation (Wolf et al., 2008; Pinter et 
al., 2007) measures different motivations on PDG
Results
Anticipated Results:
2 (Leader decision) x 2 (Payout) regression 
examined leader evaluation with social 
identification and NGI as moderators.
-- NGI predicted an interaction of payout and 
leader decision moderated by level of NGI
• High NGI should be linked with favorable 
evaluations of leader when the decision results 
in a high payout, regardless of decision
-- SIT predicted an interaction of payout and 
leader decision moderated by group identification
• High group identification should be linked with 
favorable evaluations of the leader when the 
decision results in a high payout, regardless of 
the decision
-- RGCT predicted an effect of payout
• High payouts should lead to positive evaluations 
of the leader
Conclusion
Group members may have viewed a high payout 
dissenting leader as more “leader like.” 
Preliminary Results:
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Figure 1. PDG matrix
While not significant, means trended such that a 
dissenting leader, whose decision resulted in a 
high payout, was evaluated favorably.
